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Abstract
Common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas distinguish themselves from general public good problems by encompassing both
social and physical features. This paper examines how a physical mechanism, namely asymmetric payoff; and a social
mechanism, reciprocity; simultaneously affect collective cooperation in theoretical water sharing interactions. We present an
iterative N-person game theoretic model to investigate the joint effects of these two mechanisms in a linear fully connected
river system under three information assumptions. From a simple evolutionary perspective, this paper quantitatively
addresses the conditions for Nash Equilibrium in which collective cooperation might be established. The results suggest
that direct reciprocity increases every actor’s motivation to contribute to the collective good of the river system. Meanwhile,
various upstream and downstream actors manifest individual disparities as a result of the direct reciprocity and asymmetric
payoff mechanisms. More specifically, the downstream actors are less willing to cooperate unless there is a high probability
that long-term interactions are ensured; however, a greater level of asymmetries is likely to increase upstream actors’
incentives to cooperate even though the interactions could quickly end. The upstream actors also display weak sensitivity to
an increase in the total number of actors, which generally results in a reduction in the other actors’ motivation for
cooperation. It is also shown that the indirect reciprocity mechanism relaxes the overall conditions for cooperative Nash
Equilibrium.
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Introduction
The emergence and evolution of collective cooperation in
common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas have fascinated scholars
from various disciplines [1–8]. The fundamental puzzle lies in the
mechanisms that facilitate costly cooperative and altruistic
behavior of individuals who interact with other competitors in
rigorous environments. Previous literature on social theory and
public good problem has shown that some social mechanisms such
as direct reciprocity (repeated interactions) and indirect reciprocity
(reputation) can augment the level of collective cooperation [8–
15]. Yet as much as the underlying structure of CPR dilemmas
might be analogous to general public good problems, it is worth
noting that a CPR system is unique in the sense of involving both
physical and social attributes. These two mutually interconnected
dimensions constitute the context in which human beings interact
with nature as well as with each other. Therefore, to better
understand the dynamics of collective action in governing CPRs,
we argue that it is important to simultaneously examine the social
and physical characteristics of CPR systems.
One of the main features of CPR systems is individuals’
heterogeneities that are attributed to their physical geographies.
For instance, different upstream and downstream actors are
heterogeneous in terms of their influences to a river system. They
are also diverse in the sense of being victims or beneficiaries who
are dependent on other actors’ behavior. However, most general
theoretic studies of collective action in CPR dilemmas have been
established on an assumption that all actors share symmetric
access and position with regard to the commons [2,4,16–19]. It is
worth noting that individual asymmetries might be able to
substantially change the structures and results of previous theoretic
models. Therefore, it warrants further study on the elements that
constitute the asymmetries as well as the internal and external
asymmetric mechanisms under which certain regularities might
hold.
In this paper, we focus on surface water, which is a controversial
CPR that flows across physical boundaries. With a lack of
theoretical studies on the asymmetric gains and losses associated
with the geographical locations and actions of different upstream
and downstream actors, we aim to establish a formal model to
investigate how a physical mechanism (asymmetric payoff) and a
social mechanism (reciprocity) jointly affect collective cooperation
in water sharing interactions. Built upon Raub and Weesie’s [20]
model regarding reputation and efficiency in social interactions,
our study adds to previous literature in four main aspects. Firstly,
we apply a game theoretic model to analyze a specific linear
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configuration which resembles a river system in the real world.
Secondly, we incorporate multi-players into the game theoretic
model to demonstrate a more complex group interaction of
sharing limited water resources. Thirdly, asymmetric payoffs are
integrated with the model to reflect heterogeneous features that
are attached to different upstream and downstream actors. Finally,
the study simultaneously analyzes the effects of two mechanisms
which involve both physical and social attributes of a river system.
This paper first presents an iterative N-person Prisoner’s
Dilemma Game (PDG) which enables the direct reciprocity
mechanism under which peer punishment could be enforced in
future encounters between any two actors. Then with a simple
evolutionary approach, we introduce the indirect reciprocity
mechanism under which every actor in the game could respond
to other actors’ behavior based on the information one has
received through a linear system. Also, we incorporate the
asymmetric payoff mechanism into the model by modifying the
standard PDG payoff matrix. Moreover, we quantitatively address
conditions for cooperative Nash Equilibrium (NE) under three
different information scenarios. Lastly, we perform numerical
simulations in Matlab to illustrate the effects of each independent
variable under the equilibrium conditions and provide intuitive
explanations on the implications of the asymmetric payoff and
reciprocity mechanisms.
Methods
Consider a river system that consists of a finite number of n
actors (A1, A2…Ai…An) who are located along the river in a fixed
sequence as shown in Figure 1. The subscripts denote geograph-
ical locations of the actors. We refer to A1 as the head-end actor
and An as the tail-end actor. Being confined by the boundaries of
the catchment, interactions between all water users are assumed to
occur in an abstract linear system. Also, the water users along the
river are institutional actors who have to engage in activities of
utilizing water resources on a regular basis. Thus they are assumed
to be unable to refuse participation; however, there is a probability
that the interactions may end, i.e. the decision-makers of the
institutional actors might be replaced or purposely move out of the
river system. Follow the rational choice theory, the actors are
assumed to be selfish who aim at maximizing their payoffs.
We assume that all actors are playing the PDGs on a discrete
time scale (t = 1, 2, 3…) till an indefinite end. The event
continues with a probability 0,b,1. Within each event moment
t, every actor must make a binary choice between contributing to
preserve the river environment (C) and inconsiderately exploiting
the water resources (D). The choice of every actor is made
simultaneously. We assume every actor is fully informed on both
alternatives (C or D). We also refer to C as cooperation and D as
defection in some of the following analysis. Once the action is
made, any actor Ai cannot behave differently towards others within
a single event moment. It implies that actor Ai actually plays a
large game which is composed of n-1 pairwise PDGs (supergames)
against all other actors within every event moment. By allowing
the game to be indefinitely repeated, the direct reciprocity
mechanism is thus established in the way that any actor is able
to reciprocate with others who had cooperated or defected against
himself in potential future interactions.
Then we introduce the indirect reciprocity mechanism by
adding an information set to the model. The information set Ii is a
profile of other actors’ behavior that any actor Ai obtained. It is a
critical element of the indirect reciprocity mechanism; because, in
an interconnected social structure, every actor’s present behavior
might not only influence his present utility, it also generates a
reputation which influences other participants’ actions towards
him in their potential future interactions. Therefore, we assume
that every actor’s choice of action in each event moment is
dependent on the evolving information set that they have obtained
during the course of the game.
Next, we introduce the asymmetric payoff mechanism by
adding a parameter a to the standard PDG payoff matrix as
follows,
j
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j
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, aii,jza
j
i,j~1; Q is a positive real
number which indicates the degree of asymmetries; 1ƒivjƒn,
i,j[Zz. For later reference, we define d(x)~aii,i{xza
i
i,izx i.e.
j = i2x or i+x, aii,j~0 if j.n or j,1. We also define c= (T2R)/
(T2P), where 0,c,1 and c is a constant under the given payoff
matrix. Basically, c is an indicator of actors’ short-term incentive
for defection.
This modification to the payoff matrix corresponds to the basic
physical feature of the river system. That is, any actor’s
cooperative behavior will produce a public good, i.e. ecological
service to the river system. The public good is shared by all actors,
among whom the relative downstream actors benefit more than
the upstream ones. Similarly, any actor’s defective behavior will
generate a loss to the public good, i.e. environmental degradation.
This negative outcome is also shared by all actors, among whom
the relative downstream actors lose more than the upstream ones.
One might have a mistaken belief that the downstream actors’
behavior cannot affect the upstream actors. As a matter of fact, a
river system is a complete ecological unit in which one actor’s
behavior affects all other actors one way or another. For instance,
the water quality at the river mouth influences fishes that migrate
back upstream to mate and reproduce. The sediment deposition
and wetlands at the very downstream of the river are also of great
ecological value to upstream areas. Therefore, we argue it is safe to
assume, as we presented in the payoff matrix, that the relative
downstream actors are more vulnerable to the defection made by
the upstream actors than the other way around.
It is worth noting that every pairwise interaction is essentially a
PDG although the shares that are obtained by every actor are
asymmetric. Here aii,j and a
j
i,j denote the share of utilities that are
allocated to actor Ai and actor Aj respectively in their interaction.
The asymmetric parameter a is adjusted by relative geographical
Figure 1. Geographic distribution of water users.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073793.g001
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distribution of any two actors Ai and Aj, as well as the exploitation
variable Q. Here we assume i,j and thus actor Aj is located
downstream actor Ai. The exploitation variable Q represents the
degree to which one actor is differentiated from another in terms
of utilities allocation. The larger Q is the greater asymmetric payoff
effect is produced on every actor in the game. In consistent with
the ecological characteristics, notice that the tail-end actor is the
one that most exposed to the behavior of others, whereas the
potential ramifications of other actors’ behavior gradually
decreases the further upstream the actors are located.
With the asymmetric payoff mechanism, the long-term expected
utilities of any actor is not only dependent on the strategies of their
own and the strategies of other actors, it is also dependent on their
geographical locations and the asymmetric parameter a. Accord-
ingly, we can address the utility function for any actor Ai at a
particular moment t as follows:
Uit~f (Vt,a
i
i,j)~
XVt
j
2Raii,jz
XN{Vt{i
j
2Saii,j if sit~C ð1Þ
Uit~g(Vt,a
i
i,j)~
XVt
j
2Taii,jz
XN{Vt{i
j
2Paii,j if sit~D ð2Þ
where Uit denotes the utility of Ai at moment t, sit denotes the
action of Ai at moment t. jMVt, Vt = the numbers which denote the
locations of actors who choose C apart from the focal actor Ai at
moment t. N = the numbers which denote the locations of all
actors in the game. N= (1, 2,…,n),Vt(N. Thus the total utility Ui
that any actor Ai could receive during the entire game is:
Ui~
X?
t~1
bt{1Uit ð3Þ
where Ui is the exponentially discounted utility sum of Ai from
t = 1 till the indefinite end of the game.
As the game is repeated, we will analyze the game from a simple
evolutionary perspective. A desired outcome, from the view of
social efficiency, is an equilibrium in which collective cooperation
is established. In the scenario of water sharing interactions, actors
cannot be ‘dead’ in a biological sense, instead, we assign
supergame strategies which allow every actor to update their
behavior based on the information they obtain during the course
of the game. It is well known that pure strategy C is strictly
dominated by D in the PDG. It is also known that unconditional
cooperative supergame strategy, which means an actor always
chooses C in a supergame regardless of other actors’ choices, is not
individually rational because it is strictly dominated by uncondi-
tional defective supergame strategy [21,22]. However, conditional
cooperation could be a rational strategy if the choice of C by all
actors in all their interactions is the best strategy to use against
each other. In other words, collective cooperation might be
established when all actors reach an NE in which C is chosen by
every actor throughout the game at each moment and no actor
can be strictly better off by switching one or more of their
supergame strategies given the remaining actors stick with their
supergame strategies [20]. There exist countless conditional
cooperative supergame strategies as the game is indefinitely
repeated. For analytical simplicity, we adopt a classical conditional
strategy called ‘‘trigger’’, which suggests an actor to enter the game
with C and then always play D once notified with any defection.
The ‘‘trigger’’ is a non-forgiving strategy. One might consider
using other conditional strategies that are less strict. Surely more
sophisticated defined supergame strategies will enrich the study.
However, they will meanwhile extensively increase the complexity
of the model. Most importantly, the purpose of this paper is to
focus on the effects of asymmetric payoff and reciprocity
mechanisms and our following analysis remains valid if other
strategies are used. Hence the application of alternative supergame
strategies can be discussed in future studies.
Results
The model is analyzed in three scenarios in which information
diffuses through the linear system at different rates. This section
aims at addressing conditions for NE in which collective
cooperation might be respectively achieved under the three
information scenarios. The asymmetric payoff and reciprocity
mechanisms are analyzed simultaneously.
Atomized interactions
We begin with the simplest scenario. Assuming that the
information any actor Ai can possibly receive is only from actors
who are located adjacent to him (Ai+1 and Ai21). This information
is assumed to be received right after an action is committed by Ai+1
and Ai21 at moment t. Under this specific assumption, interactions
are atomized in the sense that an actor only gets information from
nobody else but his contiguous actors.
Assumption 1. Each actor Ai receives information on the
history of their contiguous actors Ai+1 and Ai21, that is for all i and
t,
Ii(t)~Hi{1(t)|Hiz1(t)
where Ii(t) denotes actor Ai’s information set at moment t, Hi(t)
denotes the history of Ai’s actions at moment t, Hi(t) = Q if i#0 or
i.n or t#1.
Based on non-cooperative game theory, it is already known that
either ALL-C (always play C or any other strategy that never
initiates a D) or ALL-D (always play D) is a best-response strategy
should all other actors use ‘‘trigger’’ [20,23]. Therefore, to address
the necessary and sufficient conditions under which collective
cooperation is in NE, one needs to compare any actor Ai’s
expected utilities of using ALL-C with his expected utilities of
using ALL-D. The conditions for cooperative NE is equivalent to
the conditions under which the following inequality stands for any
i = 1,2,…,n.
E(Ui ALL{Dj )ƒE(Ui ALL{Cj ) ð4Þ
With the asymmetric payoff matrix, obviously each actor
receives different utilities in each event. Yet the expected utilities
for any actor Ai of using ALL-C against all other actors who stick
with ‘‘trigger’’ is only dependent on their spatial locations
regardless of their information situations; because, C will be
chosen by every actor throughout the game as no actor will ever
initiate a defection according to their supergame strategy (ALL-C
or trigger). According to Equation (1), any actor Ai’s expected
utilities of using ALL-C is,
E Ui ALL{Cj
 
~
2R
1{b
Xi{1
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~iz1
aii,j
 
ð5Þ
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It is, however, complex to calculate actor Ai’s expected utilities
of using ALL-D. The results vary significantly under different
information assumptions. Due to the asymmetric payoff mecha-
nism, the results are also greatly dependent on the actors’
geographical locations. We provide a brief summary on the
calculation and then derive the conditions for cooperative NE in
each information scenario.
Assumption 1 illustrates a situation in which actors are
poorly connected by information. For example, if actor Ai
initiates a defection in the game at moment 1, then only actors
Ai21 and Ai+1 will be aware of the defection and start to defect at
moment 2, the rest of the actors will still choose C. Likewise, only
actors Ai22 and Ai+2 will realize the defection of Ai21 and Ai+1, and
then start to defect at moment 3, and so forth. In general,
defection can only diffuse through contiguity in the atomized
system towards both upstream and downstream directions. As
actor Ai’s geographical location affects the evolution of the game,
the calculation is carried out in two scenarios in which Ai is located
either in relative upstream (i # |n/2|) or downstream (i . |n/2|)
the river.
(1) If actor Ai uses ALL-D and i # |n/2|, then actor An will be
the last one who realizes that another actor had defected
before. Thus actor An will start to defect at moment n-i+1,
from which all actors will always defect afterwards. We divide
the total expected utility of Ai into two parts as shown in
Equation (6). The first part calculates actor Ai’s utilities before
actor An turns to defection; the second part is actor Ai’s utilities
when there is no cooperative behavior exists in the game.
E Ui ALL{Dj
 
~
X?
t~1
bt{1Uit~
Xn{i
t~1
bt{1Uitz
X?
t~n{iz1
bt{1Uit ð6Þ
For part one,
Xn{i
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bt{1Uit~2T(
Xi{1
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aii,jz
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j~iz1
aii,j)z
b½2T(
Xi{2
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aii,jz
Xn
j~iz2
aii,j)z2P(
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j~iz1
aii,j)zb2½2T(
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X2i{nz1
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~n{1
aii,j)z
2P(
Xi{1
j~2i{nz2
aii,jz
Xn{2
j~iz1
aii,j)z
bn{i{1½2T(
X2i{n
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~n
aii,j)z
2P(
Xi{1
j~2i{nz1
aii,jz
Xn{1
j~iz1
aii,j)
Multiply b on each side of the equation and with some basic
algebra we will have
(1{b)
Xn{i
t~1
bt{1Uit~2T(
Xi{1
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~iz1
aii,j)z
2(P{T)½b(aii,i{1zaii,iz1)zb2(aii,i{1zaii,iz1)z   z
bn{i{1(aii,2i{nz1za
i
i,n{1){bn{i½2T(
X2i{n
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~n
aii,j)z2P(
Xi{1
j~2i{nz1
aii,jz
Xn{1
j~iz1
aii,j)
ð7Þ
For part two,
X?
t~n{iz1
bt{1Uit~
bn{i2P(
Pi{1
j~2i{n a
i
i,jz
Pn
j~iz1 a
i
i,j)
1{b
ð8Þ
Combining Equation (7) & (8) and we can solve Equation (6).
Put them back to Inequality (4) with Equation (5) we will have,
cƒ bd(1)zb
2d(2)z   zbn{i{1d(n{i{1)zbn{id(n{i)Pi{1
j~1 a
i
i,jz
Pn
j~iz1 a
i
i,j
ð9Þ
(1) If actor Ai uses ALL-D and i . |n/2|, then actor A1 will be
the last one who realizes another actor had defected before.
Thus actor A1 will start to defect at moment i, from which all
actors will always defect afterwards. Likewise, we divide the
total expected utilities of A1 into the following two parts.
E Ui ALL{Dj
 
~
X?
t~1
bt{1Uit~
Xi{1
t~1
bt{1Uitz
X?
t~i
bt{1Uit ð10Þ
Without repeating a similar calculation as the one presented
above, we will have the following equilibrium condition.
cƒbd(1)zb
2d(2)z   zbi{2d(i{2)zbi{1d(i{1)Pi{1
j~1 a
i
i,jz
Pn
j~iz1 a
i
i,j
ð11Þ
Summarizing the results of actor Ai’s expected utilities when he
is either located upstream or downstream, there is a condition for
equilibrium outcome which suggests collective cooperation might
be reached under Assumption 1.
Condition 1. If every actor uses a trigger against each other
in an N-person PDG under Assumption 1, the system is in
cooperative Nash Equilibrium if and only if
cƒ bd(1)zb
2d(2)z    bmaxfn{i,i{1gd maxfn{i,i{1g½ Pi{1
j~1 a
i
i,jz
Pn
j~iz1 a
i
i,j
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Perfectly embedded interactions
In this section we relax the first assumption by introducing a
system which allows each actor to obtain information from all
other actors rather than his neighbors. Besides, we assume the
information is perfectly embedded in the system. It implies that
every actor receives full information about all other actors’
behaviors immediately after an action is made.
Assumption 2. Each actor Ai receives information on the
history of all actors in the game, that is for all i and t.
Ii(t)~H1(t)|H2(t)|   |Hn(t)
Under assumption 2, the expected utilities of actor Ai if he uses
ALL-D are simple to calculate. Because, any defective actor only
has one-shot opportunity to abuse other actors’ cooperation and
all actors would immediately realize the existence of a defective
actor once the defection is made. Then the entire game would turn
into full defection. Thus the expected utilities of actor Ai when he
chooses ALL-D against trigger are,
E Ui ALL{Dj
 
~
X?
t~1
bt{1Uit~2T(
Xi{1
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~iz1
aii,j)
z
2Pb(
Pi{1
j~1 a
i
i,jz
Pn
j~iz1 a
i
i,j)
1{b
ð12Þ
Put Equations (12) & (5) back to Inequality (4), we have the
equilibrium conditions for collective cooperation under Assump-
tion 2.
Condition 2. If every actor uses a trigger strategy against
each other in an N-person PDG under Assumption 2, the system is
in cooperative Nash Equilibrium if and only if
cƒb
Imperfectly embedded interactions
Either atomized or perfectly embedded interactions represent a
relatively extreme situation of information exchange. In the
following section we introduce a more realistic assumption under
which information is partly or imperfectly informed to all actors.
In particular, for any actor Ai, it is still assumed that information
can be immediately received from his contiguous actors. Mean-
while, he can also obtain information about the behavior of any
other actor Aj (i ? j), but only after a certain time lag pij, which
increases with the distance between actors Ai and Aj.
Assumption 3. Each actor Ai immediately receives informa-
tion on the history of his contiguous actors Ai+1 and Ai21, and is
informed with a time delay pij.0 on the history of all other actors,
that is for all i and t.
Ii tð Þ~H1(max (t{p0i1,0))|   |Hi{1(t)|Hiz1(t)|   |Hn(max (t{p
0
in,0))
where p’ij is the smallest integer that is strictly larger than pij.
Finding the conditions for cooperative NE under Assumption 3
is more complex due to the new parameter pij. This assumption
allows everyone to receive information from distant actors. The
parameter pij determines how soon the information can be
received. Clearly, the longer time it takes for information to
transfer, the fewer actors could have been notified that defections
have been made in earlier rounds. More generally, if a defection
was made by actor Ai, at moment 1, for any other actors Aj, i ?j
If p’ij.|i2j|, then actor Aj will defect at moment |i2j|+1;
If p’ij#|i2j|, then actor Aj will defect at moment p
’
ij+1;
It is important to note is that Assumption 1 & 2 could be
interpreted as two extreme cases of Assumption 3. That is, when
pijR‘, the information among distant actors travels so slow that
the case is the same as atomized interaction; when pijR0, the
information travels so fast that everyone will immediately be aware
of the history of all other actors as in perfectly embedded
interactions.
Although the information might travel at different rates under
Assumption 3, to find the condition for cooperative NE, we only
need to focus on a scenario in which actor Ai gains the highest
expected utilities if he uses ALL-D against all other actors who use
trigger strategy. Obviously, no rational actor would defect if his
highest expected utilities are smaller than his expected utilities of
using ALL-C.
To allow actor Ai the highest expected utilities of using ALL-D
under Assumption 3, information should only travel slightly
faster than that in atomized interactions; because, it will give
actor Ai the highest short-term benefits before the whole game
turns into universal defection. More specifically, it implies that
if Ai initiates a defection at moment 1, then actors Ai21 and Ai+1,
being Ai’s neighbors, will be aware of the defection and
start to defect at moment 2; besides, actors Ai22 and Ai+2 will
also receive the information about actor Ai and start to defect
at moment 2. Because, the information is better embedded in
this scenario than it is in atomized interactions and actors
Ai22 and Ai+2 are geographically closer to Ai than other actors.
Yet we consider Ai22 and Ai+2 are the only two more actors
who can receive the defective information so that actor Ai is
ensured to gain the maximum benefits by using ALL-D under
Assumption 3.
The calculation of actor Ai’s expected utilities is consisted of four
different scenarios in terms of the geographical location of Ai as
well as the number of actors who are located in the upstream and
downstream directions of Ai. We present the deduction for one
scenario in which actor Ai is located in relative upstream (i # |n/
2|) and the total amount of downstream actors is an even number
(n2i = 2m, mMZ+). In this scenario, actor An will be the last one who
realizes another actor had defected in earlier rounds. Actor An will
start to defect at moment (n2i)/2+1, from which all actors will
defect afterwards. Similar to the calculation under Assumption 1,
we divide the total expected utilities of actor Ai into two parts as
follows.
E Ui ALL{Dj
 
~
X?
t~1
bt{1Uit~
Xn{i
2
t~1
bt{1Uitz
X?
t~n{i
2
z1
bt{1Uit
ð13Þ
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For part one,
X(n{i)=2
t~1
bt{1Uit~2T(
Xi{1
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~iz1
aii,j)z
b½2T(
Xi{3
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~iz3
aii,j)z2P(
Xi{1
j~i{2
aii,jz
Xiz2
j~iz1
aii,j)zb2½2T(
Xi{5
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~iz5
aii,j)z
2P(
Xi{1
j~i{4
aii,jz
Xiz2
j~iz4
aii,j)z      z
b(n{i)=2{2½2T(
X2i{nz3
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~n{3
aii,j)z
2P(
Xi{1
j~2i{nz4
aii,jz
Xn{4
j~iz1
aii,j)z
b(n{i)=2{1½2T(
X2i{nz1
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~n{1
aii,j)z
2P(
Xi{1
j~2i{nz2
aii,jz
Xn{2
j~iz1
aii,j)
Multiply b on each side of the equation and with some basic
algebra we will have
(1{b)
X(n{i)=2
t~1
bt{1Uit~2T(
Xi{1
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~iz1
aii,j)z
2(P{T)½b(aii,i{2zaii,i{1zaii,iz1zaii,iz2)z
b2(aii,i{4za
i
i,i{3za
i
i,iz3za
i
i,iz4)z   z
b(n{i)=2{1(aii,2i{nz2za
i
i,2i{nz3za
i
i,n{3za
i
i,n{2)
{b(n{i)=2½2T(
X2i{nz1
j~1
aii,jz
Xn
j~n{1
aii,j)z
2P(
Xi{1
j~2i{nz2
aii,jz
Xn{2
j~iz1
aii,j)
ð14Þ
For part two,
X?
t~(n{i)=2z1
bt{1Uit~
b(n{i)=22P(
Pi{1
j~2i{n a
i
i,jz
Pn
j~iz1 a
i
i,j)
1{b
ð15Þ
Combining Equation (14) & (15) and we will solve Equation
(13). Put them back to Inequality (4) with Equation (5) we will
have,
cƒb½d(1)zd(2)zb
2½d(3)zd(4)z   zbn{i2 ½d(n{i{1)zd(n{i)Pi{1
j~1 a
i
i,jz
Pn
j~iz1 a
i
i,j
ð16Þ
The other three scenarios are i # |n/2|, n2i = 2m21, mMZ+; i
. |n/2| , i = 2m21, mMZ+ ; and i . |n/2|, i = 2m, mMZ+. The
deductions about these three scenarios are fairly the same as the
one we presented above. There are only subtle differences in their
results. Without repeating the same procedure, we have the
equilibrium conditions for collective cooperation under Assump-
tion 3.
Condition 3. If every actor uses a trigger strategy against
each other in an N-person PDG under Assumption 3, the system is
in cooperative Nash Equilibrium if and only if
when max{n2i, i} = 2m, mMZ+,
cƒb½d(1)zd(2)zb
2 ½d(3)zd(4)z   zbmaxfn{i2 , i2g½d(maxfn{i{1,i{1g)zd(maxfn{i,ig)Pi{1
j~1 a
i
i,jz
Pn
j~iz1 a
i
i,j
when max{n2i, i} = 2m21, mMZ+,
cƒb½d(1)zd(2)zb
2 ½d(3)zd(4)z   zbmaxfn{iz12 ,i{12 g½d(maxfn{i,i{2g)zd(maxfn{iz1,i{1g)Pi{1
j~1 a
i
i,jz
Pn
j~iz1 a
i
i,j
Discussion
The conditions for cooperative NE under the three assumptions
are very complex. It is thus difficult to get intuitive insights into the
implications of the equilibrium conditions. However, we are able
to find regularities from their mathematical expressions. In
particular, all of the three conditions are inequalities which
comprise of the ‘‘temptation to defect’’ c on the left and a function
on the right, which the latter is dependent on four variables n, b, Q
and i. For analytical simplicity, we respectively define the right side
function in condition 1, 2 and 3 as fa, fp and fim. Therefore the
conditions for cooperative NE could be translated into the
following mathematical expressions,
cƒVa~fa n,b,Q,ið Þ ð17Þ
cƒVp~fp bð Þ ð18Þ
cƒVim~fim n,b,Q,ið Þ ð19Þ
where Va, Vp and Vim denote the values of fa, fp and fim.
The three conditions basically imply that cooperative outcomes
might be supported under each information assumption, providing
that Va, Vp and Vim are sufficiently large to outweigh the incentive
for short-term defection c. Apparently, the larger Va, Vp and Vim is,
the more likely cooperation is achieved. We should note that the
condition for cooperative NE under perfect information is
straightforward in the sense of being only dependent on b
regardless of asymmetries in the system and the geographical
location of an actor. Whereas in the other two scenarios, it is
difficult to establish explicit understandings of the effects of n, b, Q
and i; because, all of them affect Va and Vim concurrently.
Therefore, we carry out numerical simulations in Matlab to
examine how Va and Vim respond to changes of n, b, Q and i on a
comparative basis. The simulations produce 142,560 data sets
under circumstances when n varies from 3 to 50 at a 1 interval, b
varies from 0.01 to 0.99 at a 0.01 interval, Q varies from 0.1 to 3 at
a 0.1 interval and i varies from 1 to n at a 1 interval.
To better examine the effects of each independent variable in fa
and fim, our analysis is designed to hold variables other than the
focal variable constant in selective scenarios. We start with the
total number of actor n. Then the variables b, Q and i are analyzed
under the condition that the total number of actors is fixed to 20.
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Figure 2 indicates how Va and Vim would change as the total
number of actors n increases. We considered three scenarios in
which the level of asymmetry Q is set to 0.4, 1 and 3.We select the
head-end, tail-end and midstream actors as examples to illustrate.
In each subplot, we also compare Va and Vim under two different
continuing probability 0.3 and 0.9. In general, the results
demonstrate a descending trend of Va and Vim in most scenarios.
The results correspond to Olson’s influential argument about ‘‘the
logic of collective action’’ which states that the larger a group is,
the less likely they are to create social incentives which lead its
members to provide collective goods [11]. Nonetheless, we also
discover that the head-end actor’s incentive to cooperate is hardly
affected by the group size when a high level of asymmetries exists
during the course of interactions. An intuitive explanation for this
phenomenon is that the head-end actor has most control over his
potential loss. Greater level of asymmetries reduces his depen-
dence on other actors’ behavior. Hence his risk of being defected
by others does not increase with the number of actors involved.
Figure 3 indicates how Va and Vim would change as an actor’s
geographical location i moves gradually from the source to the end
of the river. We select three scenarios in which the continuing
probability b is set to 0.3, 0.6 and 0.9. In each subplot, we also
compare how each actor reacts to variations of the levels of
asymmetric payoff under the circumstances when Q equals to 0.1,
0.5, 1, 2 and 3. Two remarks can be drawn from this figure. First,
Va and Vim increase with i at the beginning and then decrease after
Va and Vim reach their apexes. Although the position of the apexes
varies with Q and b, it implies that relative up-midstream actors
are more likely to cooperate than the others when the remaining
variables are held invariant. Second, the upstream curves in each
subplot become steeper as Q increases. It shows that greater
individual differences exist among upstream actors with higher
levels of asymmetries.
Figure 4 indicates how Va and Vim would change as the level of
asymmetries Q increases. Likewise, we select three scenarios in
which the continuing probability b is set to 0.3, 0.6 and 0.9. We
compare the motivation for cooperation of five different actors
(head-end, mid-upstream, mid, mid-downstream, tail-end). It is
shown from Figure 4 that Va and Vim for the head-end and mid-
upstream actors increase with Q, yet for downstream actors they
decrease slightly with Q and tend to stabilize though Q continues to
increase. It implies upstream actors are sensitive to the degree of
asymmetries and more likely to cooperate than downstream actors
when higher levels of asymmetries display. An intuitive explana-
tion for the joint effect of Q and i is the actors’ reactions to risks. As
the level of asymmetries increases, the upstream actors have less
reservation about the risk of being hurt by others and thus tend to
cooperate; whereas the situation is reversed for the downstream
Figure 2. The effect of total number of actors n on the conditions for cooperative NE. (a, b, c) Va for the head-end, mid-stream and tail-end
actors in atomized interactions when Q= 0.4, 1 and 3 respectively; (d, e, f) Vim for the head-end, mid-stream and tail-end actors in imperfectly
embedded interactions when Q= 0.4, 1 and 3 respectively. The curves provide each actor’s general response to the increase of the group size. Each
actor’s motivation for cooperation is represented by two curves b=0.3 and 0.9 in every subplot.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073793.g002
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actors who bear increasing risks thus their motivation for
cooperation tend to maintain at a low level.
Figure 5 indicates how Va and Vim would change as the
continuing probability b increases. We consider three scenarios in
which the level of asymmetries Q is set to 0.4, 1 and 3. In each
subplot, we compare the motivation for cooperation of five
different actors (head-end, mid-upstream, mid, mid-downstream,
tail-end). The value of b is generally referred as ‘‘the shadow of the
future’’ which indicates the possibility of future interactions
between all involved actors. Hence, the larger b is the more likely
the game can continue. We can draw two remarks from Figure 5.
On one hand, for a particular actor, Va and Vim increase with b
when is Q constant. It confirms that an actor is more likely to
cooperate when ‘‘the shadow of the future’’ is more significant. On
the other hand, the slope of the curves for downstream actors
becomes steeper than upstream actors when b is relatively large;
the situation is reversed when b is relatively small. It implies that
downstream actors’ motivation for cooperation increase faster
than upstream actors when there is a higher possibility that future
interactions will continue taking place. To the contrary, upstream
actors are more motivated to cooperate than downstream actors
even when there is a greater chance that the game could quickly
end. An intuitive explanation for the joint effects of b and i is
actors’ vision for their long-term interactions. For the downstream
actors, assurance of future interactions will reduce their risks by
giving them more control over other actors. They will therefore
more likely to provide cooperation. This effect is amplified by the
level of asymmetries. Whereas upstream actors are less exposed to
others hence direct reciprocate behavior would not reduce their
motivation for cooperation.
After analyzing the effect of each variable individually, in Figure
6 we present the overall conditions for cooperative NE under
Assumption 1, 2 & 3 in three dimensional graphs. Instead of
providing a condition for cooperation that is applicable to any
actor Ai in the game, we located the minimum fa and fim with
respect to i by screening our massive amount of simulation results.
This approach helps us find the single one actor who has the least
incentive for cooperation when other variables (n, b and Q) are
held invariant. The results confirmed that the tail-end actor is the
one that shows least willingness to choose C. In other words, the
conditions for cooperative NE should always stand if we apply i = n
in all the three assumptions above. In that case, fa and fim become
functions of n, b and Q. Consider the group size n= 20, we
generate the overall cooperative NE conditions as shown in Figure
6. The comparison of cooperative NE conditions reveals the effect
of indirect reciprocity mechanism. Specifically, the cooperative
Figure 3. The effect of actors’ geographical locations i on the conditions for cooperative NE when the group size is fixed to 20. (a, b,
c) Va for all of the 20 involved actors in atomized interactions when b=0.9, 0.6 and 0.3 respectively; (d, e, f) Vim for all of the 20 involved actors in
imperfectly embedded interactions when b=0.9, 0.6 and 0.3 respectively. The curves provide a comparison in terms of motivation for cooperation for
all actors who are located at different positions on the river. Each actor’s motivation for cooperation is also compared in every subplot when the
interactions take place under different levels of asymmetries Q= 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2 and 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073793.g003
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NE condition in perfectly embedded interactions is only depen-
dent on b and thus is a flat surface in Figure 6(b) regardless of
other variables. The flat surface is always above the other two
curved surfaces in Figure 6 (a) & (c), among which the former
represents atomized interactions and the latter represents imper-
fectly embedded interactions. Figure 6(d) illustrates that the effect
of indirect reciprocity mechanism and demonstrates that the
conditions for collective cooperation become less restrict when
information is better embedded in the game.
Conclusions
In this paper we simultaneously investigate the effects of
asymmetric payoff and reciprocity mechanisms on collective
cooperation in water sharing interactions. We establish a
quantitative model of iterative N-person PDG and study the
game as it evolves with all actors’ actions which are conditional on
their available information during the course of the game. Under
different information scenarios, our analysis produces conditions
for NE in which collective cooperation is likely to be established.
The results suggest that the direct reciprocity, or put it poetically
‘‘the shadow of the future’’, can increase all actors’ motivation to
contribute to the collective good. Meanwhile, various upstream
and downstream actors manifest individual disparities as a result of
the direct reciprocity and asymmetric payoff mechanisms. More
specifically, the downstream actors are less willing to contribute
unless there is a high probability that long-term interactions are
guaranteed; however, a greater level of asymmetries is more likely
to increase upstream actors’ incentives to cooperate even though
the interactions could quickly end. The upstream actors also
display weak sensitivity to an increase in the total number of
actors, which generally results in a reduction in the other actors’
motivation for cooperation. It is also shown that the indirect
reciprocity mechanism relaxes the overall conditions for cooper-
ative NE.
In general, our model is a preliminary theoretical attempt to
connect the asymmetric payoff with reciprocity mechanisms. We
endeavor to examine their joint effects on the collective behavior
of heterogeneous selfish actors in a theoretical river system. We
generate theoretical predictions based on the N-person iterative
asymmetric PDG. In this paper, we do not intend to conclude with
a deterministic argument about a causal relationship between the
two mechanisms and collective cooperation in water governance.
Obviously, a lot more theoretical models and empirical case
studies remain to be conducted. However, we do expect to provide
a more comprehensive perspective on the theory of collective
cooperation, which emphasizes the integrity of CPR systems in the
sense of including both physical and social characteristics.
Figure 4. The effect of the level of asymmetries Q on the conditions for cooperative NE when the group size is fixed to 20. (a, b, c) Va
for five involved actors (head-end, mid-upstream, mid, mid-downstream, tail-end) in atomized interactions when b=0.3, 0.6 and 0.9 respectively; (d,
e, f) Vim for five involved actors (head-end, mid-upstream, mid, mid-downstream, tail-end) in imperfectly embedded interactions when b= 0.3, 0.6 and
0.9 respectively. The curves provide each actor’s general response to the increase of the level of asymmetries.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073793.g004
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Figure 5. The effect of continuing probability b on the conditions for cooperative NE when the group size is fixed to 20. (a, b, c) Va for
five involved actors (head-end, mid-upstream, mid, mid-downstream, tail-end) in atomized interactions when Q= 0.4, 1 and 3 respectively; (d, e, f) Vim
for five involved actors (head-end, mid-upstream, mid, mid-downstream, tail-end) in imperfectly embedded interactions when Q=0.4, 1 and 3
respectively. The curves provide each actor’s general response to the increase of the continuing probability b.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073793.g005
Figure 6. Overall conditions for cooperative NE when the group size is fixed to 20. (a) conditions for cooperative NE in atomized
interactions; (b) conditions for cooperative NE in perfectly embedded interactions; (c) conditions for cooperative NE in imperfectly embedded
interactions; (d) comparison of the conditions for cooperative NE under Assumption 1, 2 & 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0073793.g006
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